Indiana Law Journal
Volume 22

Issue 3

Article 10

Spring 1947

Relevancy of Plaintiff's War Record in Personal Injury Action

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
(1947) "Relevancy of Plaintiff's War Record in Personal Injury Action," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 22 : Iss. 3 ,
Article 10.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol22/iss3/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

1947]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

plated by the negligent party.
It is submitted that if the
fact that an auomobile could no be immediaely replaced was
of such common knowledge as to be the subject of judicial

notice, a person could reasonably anticipate a period of lost
use if he negligently destroyed a truck.

EVIDENCE
RELEVANCY

OF PLAINTIFF'S WAR RECORD IN PERSONAL
INJURY ACTION

In a personal injury action, plaintiff was permitted to
testify, over objection, that he was in battle three times; handled heavy projectiles; and although wounded once he had
fully recovered before the automobile accident. Held: Admissible to show the strength and health of the plaintiff at
the time of the accident, and to meet any possible contention
that his condition afterward was the result of his military
service. In re New England Transp. Co. et al., 69 N.E. (2d)
479 (Mass. 1946).
The principal case can be defended under the general

proposition that the question of relevancy of testimony is
largely within the discretion of the trial judge.'

Ordinarily,

on the question of damages, the plaintiff in a personal injury
suit may show the state of his health prior to the injury.2
However, evidence of prior military service, in the absence
of any contention that it contributed to P's injuries, or that
he was already disabled at that time seems unjustifiable.3
7.
1.

2.

3.

Teis v. Smuggler Min. Co. 158 Fed. 260 (C.C.A. 8th, 1907); Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 55 Fla. 514, 46 So. 732
(1908).
Western Produce Co., Inc. v. Folliard, 93 F.(2d) 588 (C.C.A. 5th,
1937); New England Trust Co. v. Farr, 57 F.(2d) 103 (C.C.A.
1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 612 (1982); Pacific S.S. Co. v.
Holt, 77 F.(2d) 192 (C.C.A. 9th, 1935); Feichter v. Swift, 77
Ind. App. 427,430, 132 N.E. 662,663 (1921) (by implication).
Davis v. Smitherman, 209 Ala. 244, 96 So. 208 (1923); Louisville,
N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544,551, 14 N.E. 572,577 (1887)
(by implication); Bush v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 350
Mo. 876, 169 S.W. (2d) 331 (1943); Shackleford v. Commercial
Motor Freight, Inc. 65 N.E. (2d) 879 (Ohio 1945).
Where such charges are made, of course, the question properly
is placed in issue, and the material may be introduced in rebuttal.
E.G., Western Produce Co., Inc. v. Folliard, 93 F.(2d) 588 (C.C.A.
5th, 1937).
For other cases holding comparable evidence to be objectionable see Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. v. Godwin, 14 F.(2d) 114 (C.C.A.
5th, 1926) (plaintiff's honorable discharge held improper to show
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Every precaution should be taken to prevent the original
introduction of such material. And where its use has been
permitted, the results should be carefully examined upon appeal, to ensure that the judgment has not been influenced
thereby.
MASTER AND SERVANT
EFFECT OF "NO RIDER'S" INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff's intestate was killed while riding in defendant's truck as a guest of defendant's servant. Defendant
company had promulgated rules prohibiting riders. Judgment
for plaintiff on finding an implied waiver of rules and that
death resulted from servant's gross negligence and unlawful
acts while operating the truck within the scope of employment. Held: Reversed. The evidence was insufficient to
support finding of an implied waiver. Monroe Motor Express v. Jackson, 38 S.E. (2d) 863 (Ga. App. 1.946).
The principal case presents the question of whether a
master owes a legal duty to the unauthorized invitees of a
servant truck driver. No duty is created where the servant's act of driving is not in furtherance of the master's
business. And this is true, regardless of the presence or
absence of authority to invite third persons,' But a master
does owe a duty where scope of employment and authority to
invite third persons are co-existent. 2 In the principal case,
the servant's tortious driving was in furtherance of the master's ends, but authority to invite third persons to ride was
1.

2.

See Craig v. Tucker, 264 Ill. App. 521 (1932) where principal
was held not liable for injuries sustained by authorized guest
when agent drove vehicle in pursuit of personal pleasure. A
different result might obtain in jurisdictions having an "imputed
negligence" statute. In this respect, see Goodwin v. Goodwin,
5 Cal. App.(2d) 644, 43 P.(2d) 223 (1935), construing the
"guest" statute with a statute imputing negligence of drive to
owner of vehicle.
To complete the picture of the interplay of authority and
scope of employment, see Robertson v. Armour Co., 129 Me. 501,
152 Atl. 407 (1930), holding master not liable to unauthorized
guest of servant for servant's negligence while driving truck for
personal ends.
Bummer v. Liberty Laundry Co., 48 Cal. App. 648, 120 P.(2d)
672 (1941); Radutz v. Tribune Co., 293 Ill. App. 315, 12 N.E.
(2d) 224 (1938); Petit v. Swift and Co., 203 Minn. 270, 281
N.W. 44 (1938); Krull v. Triangle Dairy, 59 Ohio App. 107, 17
N.E.(2d) 291 (1935); Eisenhower v. Hall Motor Transit Co., 351
Pa. 200, 40 A.(2d) 458 (1945).

